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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

• Featured Item •

A NEW WAY FORWARD: A RESPONSE TO
JUDGE WEINSTEIN
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
Mass tort litigation is rife with trade-offs. For instance,
plaintiffs’ attorneys need to amass clients to achieve
economies of scale and bring effective litigation, but an
inventory of clients creates an attenuated attorney-client
relationship.1 That nontraditional relationship tends to make
clients ineffective monitors because they have little
substantive input over how their attorney handles their case.
Plus, attorneys must focus on achieving the best result for
their clients in the aggregate. This breeds standard collective
action problems including conflicts between the self-interest of
the group members and the group as a whole.
When large-scale litigation proceeds outside of formal
Rule 23 class certification—as is frequently the case after the
Class Action Fairness Act—it lacks the judicial quality control
measures that class certification affords.2 Those measures
include appointing class counsel, ensuring a fair settlement,
and authorizing attorneys’ fees.3 Without such measures, the
trade-offs, tensions, and problems multiply.
Broadly
conceived, these problems fall into three categories: agency
problems between attorneys and their clients, group problems
between plaintiffs and other plaintiffs, and competition
problems between plaintiffs’ attorneys and other plaintiffs’
attorneys.4 At the core of these problems lies the principal
*
1

Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For the
People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 172–74 (2008)
(discussing the advantages plaintiffs gain by litigating in a group).
2 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2517, 2531 (2008); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 173.
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (e), (g), (h).
4 These problems are just the tip of the iceberg. As I have observed before, these problems
incite deeper institutional questions such as:
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tension, the tension between efficiently resolving mass
litigation to maximize social welfare on one hand, and aiming
to afford individual justice to litigants on the other. Put
differently, where we draw the line and what we emphasize in
debating these trade-offs largely depends on whether we value
individual justice or welfare maximization.
Judge Jack Weinstein highlights this tension in his
Cardozo De Novo article, Preliminary Reflections on
Administration of Complex Litigations.5
In reading his
Article, two things struck me: (1) the extent to which we
perceive welfare maximization and individual justice as a
dichotomy and rely on one perspective to explain and justify
aggregation procedures, and (2) the need for judicial flexibility
and creativity in approaching large-scale litigation,
particularly in nonclass aggregation.6 As to the first point,
entrenchment in these two perspectives has led scholars down
what are now well-trodden paths to familiar debates. But the
very persistence of these debates indicates somewhat of a
stalemate rather than a solution. Accordingly, in my most
recent article, Litigating Groups, I argued for a third approach
derived from moral and political philosophy, as well as social
psychology, that focuses on inclusion within the relevant
community.7 This alternative theoretical framework identifies
an important potential source for group unity: group members’
beliefs regarding their obligations to other group members. It
is through implementing this new approach that I address the
second aspect of Judge Weinstein’s article, the need for
creative handling.
This brief Response thus divides into two parts. Part I
addresses the tension that Judge Weinstein observes in his
opening paragraphs between “the somewhat academic search
for perfection in achieving due process, development of
substantive rules of law, and the court’s decision to meet the
guideline of Rule One of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”
how litigation risks and burdens should be distributed to achieve a fair balance of
litigating power and avoid potentially serious social costs; what role, if any, should an
economic cost-benefit analysis play in defining constitutionally protected procedural
rights; why is it ever legitimate, in the name of enforcing procedural rights, for a court
to substitute its own balance of costs and benefits for the balance already struck by a
state legislature?
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 46 (2009).
5 Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigations, 2009
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 3.
6 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 172.
7 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, ALABAMA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359279.
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which requires “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.”8 Rather than addressing this tension through
either traditional lens, Part I sets forth the theory and
rationale behind an alternative “group responsibility”
approach to nonclass aggregation. It provides a condensed,
easily accessible excerpt of the more extensive theoretical
framework developed in Litigating Groups.9
Part II responds to Judge Weinstein’s use of alternative
judicial procedures, which he highlights with examples from
Agent Orange,10 Asbestos,11 Diethylstilbestrol (DES),12
Tobacco,13 Breast Implants,14 Guns,15 Zyprexa,16 and the New
York Staten Island Ferry case.17 By employing creative
approaches, advancing equitable concepts used by medieval
institutions, and tailoring his methods to fit the unique
aspects of each case, Judge Weinstein worked both with and
without Rule 23.18 Drawing on similar equitable concepts and,
in many ways, coming full circle to the medieval picture of the
“community of the vil” painted by Stephen Yeazell,19 Part II
provides preliminary details on implementing the theory
described in Part I.
I

PLAINTIFFS’ GROUPS: MEMBERSHIP AND OBLIGATIONS

In addressing the group problems, competition problems,
and agency problems produced by large-scale nonclass
litigation, scholars and judges typically emphasize either the
need to regulate conduct efficiently and deter wrongdoing to
maximize social welfare or the need for individual autonomy
and consent.20 Judge Weinstein, for example, tends toward
8
9
10
11

Weinstein, supra note 5, at 2.
Burch, supra note 7.
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
E.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated,
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
12 In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
13 E.g., Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d,
McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).
14 In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996).
15 E.g., City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2008);
NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
16 E.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig. 253 F.R.D. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
17 McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); In re City of New York,
475 F. Supp. 2d 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
18 Weinstein, supra note 5, at 5.
19 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION (1987).
20 For examples of those who tend to emphasize individual autonomy, see Richard A.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448206

2009

A N EW W A Y F O R W A R D

171

the former group, with his opinions and scholarship reflecting
both his pragmatic and his humanist side.21 In Litigating
Groups, I suggested a third approach based on group
responsibility. It contends that groups of plaintiffs may have
(or could be encouraged to develop) organic or indigenous
origins such that social norms and moral obligations provide
an internally coercive force keeping litigants together. It
thereby mitigates the group problems that arise when some
plaintiffs want to withhold consent—or “holdout”—and thus
derail a settlement agreement that is in the group’s best
interest.
By conceiving plaintiffs within large-scale litigation as a
community of sorts, we can draw upon an alternative source of
obligations: group members’ obligations to one another.
Assuming that plaintiffs actually form or could form a social
group—and there is ample evidence that they already do this
to some extent—then social psychology empirically shows that
they will demonstrate positive “other-regarding preferences.”22
They will change their views about distributive and
procedural justice such that they are no longer principally
Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10
J.L. & COM. 1 (1990); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy,
and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Roger H.
Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69.
For examples of those adopting a collective or efficiency-based approach, see JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 1 (1995); Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479
(1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1991); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and
Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996); David
Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69
B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989).
Echoes of autonomy exist in Supreme Court opinions as well. E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 755 (1989) (discussing the idea
of one’s own day in court); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 797 (1985)
(discussing class members’ rights to notice and opt out). Still others have recommendations for
mitigating between these two camps to protect both individual and group interests. See Edward
H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996);
Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 858 (1994); Francis E. Mcgovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1821 (1995); Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918
(1995); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
Many of these demarcations come from David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and
Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 914–16, 916 n.3, 916 n.4 (1998).
21 E.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 20; Jack B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass
Society, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 385 (2000).
22 Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let’s Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence
of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374–75 (2006).
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concerned about achieving the best result for themselves, but
for the collective group.23 Moreover, group members develop
and adhere to social norms such as promise-keeping,
compatibility, social agglomeration, and the desire for meansend coherence.24 These norms provide the social glue keeping
the group together and fostering cooperation. But if we are
inclined toward this alternative idea or find it worth
considering further, then we must determine what constitutes
a litigation community, what obligations follow from
membership in that community, and how to foster group
cohesion.
To determine what constitutes a litigation community, I
use a flexible umbrella term: “plural subject.”25 Put simply, a
plural subject is an instance where multiple individuals—a set
of “I’s”—become a single, plural subject—a “we.”26 As an
umbrella term, what makes plaintiffs a plural subject can vary
greatly: litigants might share the same desires, interests, or
commitments that certain plans should come to fruition; they
might collectively participate in a joint activity; or they might
decide to develop a group policy concerning the litigation.27
For instance, in corresponding with various plaintiffs involved
with the Vioxx litigation, I came across the Merck Settlement
Group, an online community committed to public education
and to understanding Merck’s settlement offer.28 The group’s
founder and moderator, Al Pennington, describes the group’s
activities in plural subject—“we”—terms:
In the first months, we were all united in our efforts to
study and understand the settlement. As we began to see
the inequities in the settlement, we all agreed that we
needed to bring these inequities to the attention of the

23 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 4; see also R. Axelrod & WD Hamilton, The Evolution
of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390 (1981); Kelly S. Bouras & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion
and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1145
(1996); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Cultural Transmission and the Evolution of
Cooperative Behavior, 10 HUMAN ECOLOGY 325 (1982); Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let’s Get
Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social
Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374–75 (2006);
Joseph Henrich, Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale
Cooperation, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 3 (2004); N.L. Kerr & C.M. Kaufman-Gilliland,
Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 513, 526–27 (1994); Mark Van Vugt & Claire M. Hart, Social Identity as Social Glue:
The Origins of Group Loyalty, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 585, 586 (2004).
24 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 43.
25 I borrow this term from Margaret Gilbert, but do not attach to it the same meaning that she
does. MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2000).
26 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 21.
27 Id.
28 Merck Settlement Group page, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MerckSettlement/.
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public in order to get [its] support to stop the settlement
and get other plaintiffs to reject the settlement. We all
agreed that we had to hit all the blogs we could find and
talk with anyone in the media who would listen.29

This group thus shared a commitment to jointly
understanding the terms of Merck’s offer.
After
understanding that offer and interpreting it to be contrary to
their best interests, the members then dedicated themselves
to preventing the settlement offer from becoming the
settlement terms.
The Merck Settlement Group is not an anomaly.
Plaintiffs regularly band together to create a credible threat to
the defendant. Groups may predate the litigation—such as
labor
unions,
veterans’
organizations,
community
organizations, and even homeowner’s associations. Or, the
litigation itself might bring people together as illustrated by
the Merck Settlement Group, Asbestos Victims of America,
and the Dalkon Shield victims’ organizations.30 As one might
imagine from these examples, plural subjects vary greatly in
their degree of cohesiveness. Thus, I use the labels “shared
cooperative activity” and “shared goals or policies” to describe
stronger, more cohesive, subsets.31 The more cohesive the
group, the more likely its members are to incur moral
obligations to one another not to opt out of their shared
endeavor. Thus, voluntary commitments form the basis for
obligations to other group members.32 Those commitments
and intentions similarly define group membership.33
Once plaintiffs decide to do something together such as
collaborating on discovery requests or sharing scientific
research on causation, they might decide to work together on
other things as well.34 They might bargain or negotiate about
how to best accomplish a desired end or even develop an
overarching goal or policy to guide their deliberations. But
they might not. The group may fall prey to disruptive forces
and disagree on key issues. Discussing issues during group
formation might turn minor variances into major rifts. Or,
29 E-mail from Al Pennington, Moderator of the Merck Settlement Group, to Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 20,
2008, 1:22 a.m. EST) (on file with author); Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 21.
30 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 20; see also Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A Peterson,
Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961,
1023 (1993); Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 919–21.
31 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 23–27.
32 Id. at 27.
33 See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
34 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 27.
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some individual outliers may have no interest in becoming
group members at all—either because of ignorance or
deliberate choice.35
Thus, the key questions become (1) what to do with the
holdouts, the dissenters, those who join the group but then
want to exit; (2) what to do with the outliers, those who have
never joined the group or considered themselves group
members; and (3) how to mitigate competition among the
inevitable subgroups that form within large-scale litigation.36
Answering these questions necessitates an understanding of
how and when members are obligated to one another.
Isolating these questions also requires that we initially make
a few significant assumptions: that the proposed settlement is
objectively fair (a slippery term with multiple meanings), that
the litigation has reached a point where collaboration and
unity among plaintiffs is desirable, and that one can bracket
the nature and purpose of the tort system and use a pluralist
perspective.37
Beginning with the first question—what to do with the
strategic holdouts—requires that we assume that settlement
is objectively fair to all of the plaintiffs. Although it is possible
that holdouts will experience a change of heart after strong
encouragement or pressure from the group, the more
controversial question is when both holdouts and outliers
must become or remain group members.38 Put differently,
when are litigants morally or legally obligated to participate
in and assent to the settlement?
The legal answer is easier in the class action context. In
Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, class members cannot
opt out of their “shared” endeavor whether they would like to
or not. Allowing opt out rights in those kinds of class actions
would create inconsistent results or deplete a limited fund,
leaving some claimants with nothing.39 The Fifth Circuit has
gone so far as to say that a “presumption of cohesiveness”
applies in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.40 Less obligatorily, Rule
23(b)(3) class members have a chance to exit from class
membership by opting out. They thus incur obligations to one
another only by remaining in the class. Even this is a fiction
of sorts—remaining in the class is the default. It is unlikely
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 6, 32.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 32, 37.
Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Co., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). Yet, a detailed look at
employment discrimination class actions regularly reveals much dissention among the ranks.
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that the class forms a genuine community. Instead, the class
action is a legally coercive force to bind people together when
the circumstances so require.
Determining when litigants are obligated to one another
is even more difficult in nonclass aggregation, like the Zyprexa
and Vioxx cases.41 Without Rule 23 to clarify the group’s
boundaries, Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa litigation and
later Judge Fallon in the Vioxx case dubbed them “quasi-class
actions” and relied on equitable doctrines to shape the
litigation.42 Quasi class actions help address the agency
problems through judicial oversight, but they, like aggregation
and consolidation, are externally coercive. The resulting
conglomerate is not an organic group; it is judicially and
procedurally constructed. Yet, bringing plaintiffs together
procedurally fosters opportunities for communities to
develop.43
Once plaintiffs’ cases are pending in the same forum, it
may be possible to avoid further externally coercive measures
by stimulating the development of an actual group that
evolves organically from relationships, promises, assurances,
social networks, commitments, and commonalities. 44 Social
and personal norms underlying these connections work handin-hand with moral obligations to address the question of
when plaintiffs in nonclass litigation are obligated to one
another as group members.
Although one might adopt
requirements for incurring obligations that range from those
used in the class action context to the contractual context, this
group responsibility approach relies on a stronger requirement
formed by promises and mutual assurances.45
Under this approach, plaintiffs involved in nonclass
aggregation who jointly and voluntarily intend X, who commit
to one another through promises or assurances, are morally
obligated to act in accordance with that intention provided
that no exit conditions to the contrary exist.46 Obligations in
this sense are initially voluntary and evolve from social
relationships within the group. Because intentions demand
41 As Judge Weinstein notes, ―Federal Rule 23 class actions have been reduced in their
impact in tort and securities cases.‖ Weinstein, supra note 5, at 18. The change is due, in large
part, to the Class Action Fairness Act. See generally Burch, supra note 2, at 2517.
42 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Vioxx
Prod. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. 2008); L. Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch],
Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class
Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 241 (2004).
43 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 30–31.
44 Id. at 36, 43–44.
45 Id. at 36–42.
46 Id. at 40.
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means-end coherence and are thereby semi-resistant to
irrational change, group members sharing intentions routinely
develop norms of consistency and stability.47
The intention, however, is not the binding force giving rise
to the obligation. Instead, the promises and assurances—the
commitment itself—morally obligate.48 Promises need not be
as explicit as saying “I promise;” rather, as evidence law
illustrates, agreements might be tacit or implicit depending on
the context.49 These promises and assurances work together
with relevant norms to bind litigants. Once the group
establishes its norms—or invokes preexisting personal or
social norms—then other members may appeal to the relevant
norm in their bargaining and reasoning, particularly if the
norm or promise is violated.50
This defines membership and explains when and how
plural subjects are morally obligated to one another to carry
out their joint intentional activity, but does not propose how
substantive or procedural laws should reinforce those
obligations.51 It is possible that once joinder mechanisms
bring people and cases together, group development will occur
and social and group norms will prove sufficiently cohesive
such that legal coercion is unnecessary.
Although this
Response focuses on this possibility, we should begin to think
about when and under what circumstances the law should
reinforce moral obligations once a certain level of moral
interconnectedness is present.52
Discussing when litigants are morally obligated to one
another partially answers the question of what to do with
holdouts—those dissenters who are initially part of the group
but then want to exit or to withhold their consent to a
settlement agreement.53
Moral conditions suggest that
47
48

Id. at 41.
Of course, this moral duty is different from a legal duty. Although these moral standards
influenced contract law, promises in and of themselves are not legally enforceable. See generally
HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS §1:2 (2008); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 296 (1986) (―A moral obligation that is not also a
valid legal obligation can only be legitimately secured by voluntary means. That is, one may
have a moral obligation to do something, but unless there is also a valid legal obligation, one
cannot legitimately be forced by another to do it.‖). Promises might be enforceable under the
equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel if the promise induces reliance and not enforcing the
promise causes injury or injustice.
49 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 38; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
50 Of course, the norm itself may be that of promise-keeping in which case the norm would
reinforce the commitment.
51 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 41.
52 My future work in this area will explore this possibility.
53 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 11–14. I should note that there are many perfectly
legitimate and understandable reasons that litigants do not consent to certain settlement
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holdouts who have made promises and assurances to other
group members are obligated to keep their promises. If they
defect, then other members can appeal to the norm of promisekeeping or alternative relevant norms to encourage
compliance.
Granted, problems of accurately identifying
promises, of reading litigants’ fluctuating intentions and
mindsets, and of enforcing amorphous commitments arise.54
As mentioned shortly, one possibility is to make those
obligations explicit and legally binding through an intraclaimant governance agreement.
II

FOSTERING GROUP DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

In some ways, relying on group and social norms to
enforce moral obligations puts the cart before the horse. To
answer more fully the question of what to do with holdouts
and outliers (those plaintiffs who do not consider themselves
group members) and to address competition between
plaintiffs’ groups, we must first determine how the judicial
system should foster group development. This Part thus
suggests: (1) using special officers to promote goal
identification and mediate differences among subgroup
members, and (2) using intra-claimant governance agreements
to memorialize commitments and establish group decisionmaking procedures.
While these remain preliminary
observations subject to further development and revision, they
retain ample flexibility for tailoring process to the unique
circumstances presented by various mass torts. As illustrated
by Judge Weinstein’s array of cases, there is no effective onesize-fits-all approach. Thus, any theoretical framework must
be elastic enough to accomodate judicial tailoring.
Accordingly, this Part highlights the nuts and bolts of
cultivating group development and group cohesion, thereby
tilling the soil for the resulting group to develop obligations to
one another.
Findings from social psychology and even evolutionary
biology suggest that once people view one another as group
members,55 their principal concern is no longer the self, but
arrangements. Perhaps the agreement sweeps the wrongdoing under the rug and the litigant wants
publicity and public education. Accordingly, I am making a very broad and—in the real world—
hotly contested assumption that the settlement is objectively fair and that the holdout is trying to
garner more money for herself without a legitimate basis.
54 Id. at 42.
55 As noted above, by ―members,‖ I do not mean those who have simply filed their own claim
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the group’s collective welfare.56 Thus, once we realize that
plural subjects incur moral obligations to one another under
certain circumstances and that group members exhibit
prosocial behaviors, then we should explore ways that the
judicial system can facilitate (or at least not inhibit) organic
group development.
As noted, when the group’s existence does not predate the
litigation, procedural aggregation frequently brings litigants’
cases to the same forum before the same judge. Although that
clustering effect does not, in and of itself, translate into a
community, the proximity might catalyze group formation.
Variables stimulating group formation and cohesion include
physical and social immediacy; recognized homogeneity of
goals, norms, values, or intentions; and shared experiences.57
Destabilizing influences include competition, heterogeneous
claims and damages, few shared life-defining experiences, few
overlapping intentions, disparate and incompatible litigation
goals, and greater geographic dispersion.58 Consequently,
bringing litigants’ cases together in the same forum can create
the physical or social proximity that dispersed mass torts—
such as product liability suits—typically lack. For instance,
the Merck Settlement Group, the Asbestos Victims of America,
and the Dalkon Shield victims’ organizations all coalesced
after coordinated pretrial handling.
Still, many litigants—even those within groups that
predate the litigation—sue the same defendant without
intending to do so cooperatively.59 Take, for example, the
Vietnam veterans’ organizations (Agent Orange Victims
International, Citizen Soldier, and Vietnam Veterans of
America), which divided ideologically over leadership, politics,
and views about the Vietnam War.60 Competition with one
another for veterans’ allegiance resulted in fractured
organizational and litigation efforts.61 Large-scale nonclass
litigation is particularly likely to experience this kind of
subgroup formation and subsequent competition over
resources, litigants, strategies, and goals.62 Accordingly, as
Judge Weinstein recognizes, bringing litigants together
against what turns out to be the same defendant; rather, ―group members,‖ refers to plural
subjects who have incurred moral obligations to one another.
56 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
57 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 16.
58 Id. at 16.
59 Id. at 24.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 27–29.
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procedurally is only the beginning.63
Once their cases are aggregated, plaintiffs might: (1)
realize that they share litigation goals and that collaborating
results in cost-savings and more credible threats, or (2) divide
or stay divided as did the veterans’ groups involved in Agent
Orange. The strength of this first proposition is that it
capitalizes on the benefits of other-regarding preferences and
thereby makes holdouts less likely. Giving litigants an
opportunity to cooperate with one another and to recognize
agreement on certain litigation activities can strengthen group
cohesion.64 In fact, one of the most robust findings in the
social psychology literature is that when a group discusses a
dilemma, they are substantially more likely to cooperate with
one another.65 Once plaintiffs cooperate on one activity, they
might decide to collaborate on other litigation-related matters;
they might find that group cohesiveness and their normative
story go hand in hand.66
Accordingly, facilitating
opportunities for litigants to determine and discuss their
litigation ends and move from amorphous intentions to
practical goals may help them acheive a better result than
striking out on their own.67
Designing opportunities for group deliberation fosters
intra-group stability and increases cooperation by eliciting
social norms such as promise-keeping, compatibility, nonabandonment, and means-end coherence.68 It also provides an
occasion for a leader to interpret and translate the situation
into a familiar schema, to ensure procedural fairness, and to
invoke the appropriate social norm: cooperating is the “right
thing to do,” one should “keep their promises,” or “we should
defect and opt out.”69 Allowing the group to design and
implement its own procedures—perhaps through an intraclaimant governance agreement—enhances cooperation,
judgments about the procedure’s fairness, and judgments
about the fairness of the substantive outcome.70 Giving
participants an opportunity to voice their opinions about the
63 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 5, at 7 (appointing ―settlement masters‖ in the Agent
Orange litigation).
64 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 24–25.
65 Id. at 44.
66 Id. at 25.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 43.
69 Id. at 43–44; see also Burch, supra note 4, at 1.
70 Burch, supra note 4, at 38; see also TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION
IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 74–75
(2000); Linda Musante et al., The Effects of Control on Perceived Fairness of Procedures and
Outcomes, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 237–38 (1983).
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decision-making and allocation process fosters belongingness
and cooperation.71
Discussing a dilemma facing the group in and of itself
raises concern and awareness for fellow group members.72
Plus, the personal norms associated with promising regularly
compel promisors to follow through with their commitments.73
Even though the default presumption—even in newly formed
groups—is to cooperate and trust the others involved, binding
pledges to cooperate are even more effective.74 Consequently,
an intra-claimant governance agreement that not only
memorializes the decision-making procedures but also the
promises elicited as the result of communication, compromise,
and assurances, may maximize prosocial cooperative
behaviors.75 In short, deliberation and mutual assurances
might entice the would-be holdout to develop other-regarding
preferences such that her concerns extend to achieving equity
for the collective group. Moreover, these opportunities may
similarly afford outliers—those plaintiffs on the outskirts of
the litigation who are not group members—the chance and
incentive to join the group, gain common knowledge,
collaborate on litigation goals, and form reciprocal
obligations.76
Turning now to the second proposition—the idea that
subgroups could polarize and compete with one another—
requires us to recognize that at some point competing groups
in large-scale litigation need to connect and coalesce, the
litigation clusters need to be smaller, or we need to design exit
mechanisms.77 After all, in the class action context, objectors,
opt-outs, and subclasses are common. Further, as the class
context illustrates, it is possible for group dynamics to produce
anti-social behaviors. In these instances, emergent group
behavior may need to be managed based on our normative
goals.
Accordingly, I focus here on the possibility of
connecting and coalescing competing subgroups, though I
remain open to the idea of smaller litigation clusters—
“polycentric litigation”—and to designing exit mechanisms.78
71
72
73
74

Burch, supra note 4, at passim.
Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 45.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 46; see also X. Chen & S.S. Komorita, The Effects of Communication and
Commitment in a Public Goods Social Dilemma, 60 ORGAN. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION
PROCESSES 367–86 (1994).
75 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 46.
76 Id. at 47.
77 Id.
78 I find the idea worth further consideration, but recognize that doing so necessitates
rethinking the preclusion doctrines and use of the All Writs Act. I’ve discussed the idea in
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By emphasizing the subgroups’ commonalities and
minimizing their distinctions (called “salient social
categorization”), a “special officer” appointed by the court to
mediate between feuding plaintiffs’ factions could encourage
plaintiffs to reconceptualize the aggregate as one
superordinate group.79 In this way, special officers could serve
as a go-between for competing plaintiffs.80 Because plaintiffs’
attorneys regularly (and appropriately) act as zealous
advocates, most of the information that plaintiffs receive is
filtered through that lens. Accordingly, plaintiffs often lack
the information necessary to make fully informed judgments.
Thus, a special officer could provide claimants with missing
information, such as the strength of their claims vis-à-vis
others.
Moreover, the special officer could work with
competing subgroups to design collective decision-making
procedures that detail the conditions and circumstances for
exit and voice.81
Bringing litigants together in small discussion groups
humanizes the process by giving them an opportunity to meet
one another. For instance, Francis McGovern served as a
special master in the Rhode Island nightclub fire that killed
one hundred people and injured more than two hundred.82 By
holding twenty-one group meetings with over three-hundred
victims and their families, plaintiffs could see those who were
severely disfigured, those who suffered from losing a loved
one, and those who were less directly impacted.83 By asking

Litigating Groups, ALABAMA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 47–48, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359279); Burch, supra note 4, at 55.
79 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 48. The ALI mentions use of a ―special officer‖ in its
draft. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §3.02
cmt. a, §3.09, cmt. a (November, 2008 draft). The meaning attributed to ―special officer‖ by the
ALI is synonymous with my use of the term here. Other scholars have also suggested the use of a
mediator or special master for large-scale litigation. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking
the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 513 (1998); Deborah
R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, The
Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 72 (Autumn, 1990); Francis E.
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1378
(2005); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much
Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003).
80 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 allows federal courts to appoint special masters.
81 See Paula W. Potter, Procedural Justice and Voice Effects, 10 J. ORG. CULTURE, COMM. &
CONFLICT 33, 33–34 (2006) (―Research has consistently shown that granting individuals the
opportunity to voice their preferences and opinions during the decision-making process increases
fairness judgments.‖).
82 Tracy Breton, Station Lawyers Recommend Guardian, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Aug. 1,
2008, at 1.
83 Id.; Burch, supra note 4, at 23.
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each person about their preferred litigation outcome and
presenting various compensation distribution models used in
past disasters, he fostered group deliberation and cohesion.84
Similarly, Judge Weinstein appointed Ken Feinberg as a
“settlement master” in the DES cases85 and used Feinberg and
David I. Shapiro as special masters in the Agent Orange
litigation.86 Ken Feinberg also acted as the special master in
the September 11 Compensation Fund, where he traveled to
different jurisdictions across the country and conducted
countless town hall meetings in schools, community centers,
and hotels.87 This afforded victims some degree of procedural
justice by allowing them to participate in an on-going
discussion and to tell their story. Feinberg credits this aspect
of the process as “the essential reason that the program was so
successful.”88 The 97% participation rate tends to confirm his
claim.89
These regional discussions make group formation,
discussion, and cooperation feasible in both small-scale and
large-scale litigation.90 The idea of using a special officer in
this way simultaneously retains the necessary flexibility to
accommodate the unique aspects of each mass tort. Of course,
the idea of using a special officer, settlement master, or special
master is not new.91 What is different, however, is using a
special officer to mediate solely or at least principally between
feuding plaintiffs’ groups and to facilitate collaboration and
development of group decision-making procedures that might
be embodied in an intra-claimant governance agreement.
Encouraging groups to discuss the dilemmas facing them
fosters group cohesion. And cohesive groups provide a more
durable solution to the challenges inherent in collective
84
85
86
87
88

Burch, supra note 4, at 23–24.
In re New York Co. DES Litig., 142 F.R.D. 58, 59 (1992).
In re ―Agent Orange‖ Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 50.
Kenneth R. Feinberg, How Can ADR Alleviate Long-Standing Social Problems?, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 785, 789 (2007); see also KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?:
THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 164 (2005).
89 FEINBERG, supra note 88, at 161.
90 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 50.
91 Other scholars have also suggested the use of a mediator or special master for large-scale
litigation. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a
Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and
Process, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513 (1998); Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half
Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1587 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 72 (Autumn, 1990); Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims
Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1378 (2005); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist
Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003).
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litigation, particularly client-client and attorney-client
conflicts. This focus on group cohesion reallocates power to
the plaintiffs themselves. Unlike most scholarship on this
topic, this Response does not concede or assume that the
attorney rightly acts as the fulcrum in aggregate litigation.92
The attorney’s role and the power imbalance it creates is the
principal cause of many of the conflicts in nonclass
aggregation. And yet, much of aggregate litigation would
never begin without entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys
acting as private attorneys general.
Consequently,
strengthening group cohesion post-aggregation can restore the
tether between the group and its agent and better situate the
group to monitor the litigation.93 Allowing the group itself to
design and implement fair procedures for group deliberation,
collective decision-making, and allocation provides procedural
justice components that large-scale court-based litigation
typically lacks.
It also suggests, at least in some ways, a return to the
communal obligations from which the class action emerged.
As developed by Stephen Yeazell, the modern-day class action
can be traced back to medieval guilds, where community
members shared collectively in the duties, obligations, and
privileges of “villeinage” membership.94
All community
members were jointly liable for any duty that was principally
assigned to just one person.95 The courts regularly imposed
collective liability on villages for these obligations regardless
of who bore individual responsibility.96 Of course, with the
increase of technology and mobility, our modern-day society
often lacks the interpersonal relationships that form
community bonds. But sociation still occurs—it ranges from
simply walking together, to developing friendships, to building
families, to less personal activities such as staying in the same
hotel.97 Thus, it seems, at least in some ways, that the way
forward calls us to modernize, strengthen, and reinvigorate
certain community ideals inherent in medieval times.
In sum, even if we disagree about when obligations arise
or how to enforce the content of those obligations, I urge us all
to think about how communal and group obligations can and
92
93
94
95

Burch, supra note 7, at 7.
Id.
YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 41–48; see also Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 17.
YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 48 (quoting PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE
MANOR 318–19 (rev. 2d ed., George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1932) (1911)).
96 Id. at 50–51.
97 MARGARET GILBERT, Societies, Membership, and Obligation, in A THEORY OF POLITICAL
OBLIGATION 97 (2006) (quoting Georg Simmel).
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do impact litigants. This alternative way of thinking means
that the content of litigants’ rights and duties may not depend
solely on what maximizes the general welfare or what
preserves litigants’ individual autonomy, but also on what
follows from plaintiffs’ membership in a particular group.
CONCLUSION
I share Judge Weinstein’s pessimism that appellate courts
are hostile to class actions and other devices for efficient
administration of mass litigation, but I am less convinced than
he that administrative agencies are the right way forward. As
I have written in the past, administrative agencies introduce a
new host of problems including the stigma of being less
legitimate than their judicial counterparts.98 Moreover, so
long as mass torts continue to be used as venue for social
policy debates, they should not be relegated to the bowels of
administrative processing.99 The system must retain the
transparency necessary to serve both its public and private
ends.
Although this Response takes issue with Judge
Weinstein’s contention that much of complex litigation should
“fall on the shoulders of administrative agencies” and instead
suggests the alternative proposal of using special officers and
moral obligations, difficult work remains in fully formulating
that proposal. This account is currently incomplete; the devil
is, as always, in the details. Future scholarship must craft
feasible procedures to promote cooperation, decide when and
how to impose sanctions when norms and moral obligations
fail, determine when exiting the group is appropriate, and
contemplate how to accomplish that departure in the best way
possible. Moreover, the barebones structure as sketched here
and more fully developed in Litigating Groups requires
further development to take into account non-reciprocal, nonproportional obligations. If we think of a group as an
interconnected set of individuals, some of those individuals
will have obligations to others within the group that are
inapplicable to the group as a whole. Only some obligations
are reciprocal, and only some are proportional.
If we begin to think about nonclass aggregation as a

98
99

See Burch, supra note 2, at 2533–36.
To be sure, this same criticism can be levied at confidential settlements within the current
system.
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system with a panoply of interactions between agents, rules,
procedures, and institutions, then we can better evaluate the
ripple effect of change. Grappling with what constitutes a
litigation community and what obligations flow from
membership within that community is just one small piece of
the puzzle for institutional design. But it is a critical
component. It has the potential to enable the litigants
themselves to do some of the heavy lifting rather than
requiring hefty doses of judicial coercion. And understanding
the system and the group dynamics within it may enable us
eventually to design and employ a process that more
effectively equalizes litigating power.100
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